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I. NORTH KOREA V. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
Oscar Wilde, noted poet and author, once said, “Society produces rogues, and 
education makes one rogue cleverer than another.”  Although Wilde was undoubtedly 
referring to the individual and his place in the cultural society of man, can we stretch this 
paradigm to meet the threshold of international politics?  In the world in which we live, it 
is commonly accepted that there are pariah states, nations that cause concern and 
continually pose a threat to the security of other states in the system.  North Korea is one 
such state that has been given rogue status.  But what does that mean, exactly?  
Obviously in order for a state to be deemed a “rogue,” it must fit some sort of archetype 
or meet some criteria that put it at odds with other states in the system.  Consequently, it 
must be inferred that there is some sort of standard or set of norms that a state like North 
Korea contradicts.  If that is in fact the case, then it must be fleshed out what those norms 
are and how they became conventional.  The boundaries of the system and the nature of 
the international society need to be determined in order to understand how the outlier 
stacks up to the rest of the order.   
The real question is why does North Korea act in the manner that it does. Why 
does North Korea exhibit “rogue” behavior?  This is a critical question from a major 
power perspective.  North Korea views the system differently from the rest of the world. 
This paper will argue that both during and after the Cold War, North Korea has acted in a 
manner that deviates from the norms of the system   In order to resolve the security threat 
that a rogue North Korea presents, the major powers must understand how and why the 
DPRK views the world.      
North Korean negotiating behavior and state policy has been characterized as 
irrational and at times even insane.  Yet many who take a thorough look at the behavior 
have determined that it is actually calculated maneuvering, designed to manipulate the 
rest of the players in the international system.1  Other works have examined the causes of 
North Korean behavior and have simplified the argument into one of spiral versus 
                                                 
1 Snyder, Scott. Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior. Washington, DC: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 1999. p. 80. 
 2
deterrence.2  It is a chicken and egg debate of sorts.  This debate questions whether North 
Korea acts on a path dependent course and is spiraling out of control toward extinction or 
is it acting out of security concerns in response to the threats imposed on it by the United 
States.  It is my contention that debate such as this over-simplifies the issue.  Theories of 
this nature suggest that North Korea does not control its interaction with the world.  To 
the contrary, I would argue that North Korea has been very deliberate in its interaction 
with the rest of the world. 
It is extremely difficult to negotiate when the opposing side views the system 
differently.  If a rogue is a realist and the rest of the international society clings to an 
interdependent view of the world, resolution does not look good.   The two have different 
sets of rules, which govern their actions.  Without realizing this paradox the major 
powers perpetuate the rogue’s behavior rather than curtailing it.  In order for two parties 
to find an agreeable settlement they not only have to be playing by the same rules, but 
they have to be playing the same game. 
 
A.  HISTORICAL INFLUENCE ON POLITICAL CULTURE 
Oppression from foreign nations during Korean modernization has left the Korean 
people distrustful of outside influences, and the Korean War has left a people divided.  
North Korea under the leadership of Kim Il Sung, spent four decades developing a 
national identity that contradicts the ideas of cooperative engagement and rejects the 
notion of an international community. 
Despite the agreed truce in 1953, there was never a formal end that involved a 
signed treaty or a non-aggression pact.  In effect, according to Koreans living on both 
sides of the 38th parallel, the civil war continues today.3   The Korean War was the first 
and perhaps the longest lasting fallout of the Cold War in Asia.  Two superpowers 
entered into a third nation’s civil war when really they were fighting a proxy war in the 
                                                 
2 Ibid. pp. 68-76. 
3 Oh, Kong Dan and Ralph C. Hassig. North Korea Through the Looking Glass. Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2000. 
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larger conflict of communism versus democracy.4   The conflict shaped North Korea's 
fate, and the country was left to live with the hand it was dealt.   
 The DPRK, while currently regarded as a rogue nation, was once a satellite of the 
Soviet Union and remains in close contact with one of the last communist states, the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC).  From the West’s perspective, North Korea developed 
on the wrong side of the iron curtain for the last half of the 20th century.  Its designation 
as a pariah state was sealed when the Soviet Union and the rest of the Soviet bloc nations 
resigned from communism in the early 1990s.  Without the support of a strong 
communist brotherhood, North Korea had to reform or stand-alone. 
 Yet, while educated in the teachings of Marx and Lenin, and advised by the PRC 
and USSR throughout its development, North Korea under the Kim dynasty has become 
its own ideological entity.  The juche philosophy of self-reliance has led this state to 
pursue a predominantly isolationist policy of limited engagement.  Nestled under the 
wings of larger communist nations, the DPRK relied on China and the Soviet Union for 
economic and military aid.  However, this reclusive nation even withdrew from its 
communist allies when self-interest was at stake. 
North Korea and the Kim Dynasty were not ready to subject themselves to regime 
change or conform to the trend of democratization in the early 1990s.  As a result North 
Korea did what it perceived as necessary to survive: it turned inward and relied on the 
juche ideology and the Kim leadership to prevail. 
 
B. ROGUE STATE: AS DEFINED BY UNITED STATES 
In President Bush’s famed “Axis of Evil” speech, North Korea, though not 
specifically labeled “rogue,” was clearly marked as a state that exists on the periphery of 
the international order.5  Just one year after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on 
America, the Bush White House issued a formal definition of the term in its National 
Security Strategy of the United States of America.  “In the 1990s we witnessed the 
emergence of a small number of rogue states that . . . share a number of attributes.”  
These states:  
                                                 
4 Henthorn, William. A History of Korea. NY: Free Press, 1971. 
5 The U.S. President's State of the Union Address. Washington, D.C. (January 29, 2002). 
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…brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for the 
personal gain of the rulers; display no regard for international law, 
threaten their neighbors, and callously violate international treaties to 
which they are party; are determined to acquire weapons of mass 
destruction, along with other advanced military technology, to be used as 
threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes; 
sponsor terrorism around the globe; and reject basic human values and 
hate the United States and everything for which it stands.6 
This was not the first time the term “rogue state” had been used.  The term was 
first used by the U.S. government in the 1990s under President Bill Clinton to describe 
nations that were considered to pose a threat to the United States.  Under the Clinton 
administration the term typically referred to states ruled by authoritarian regimes that 
severely restricted human rights, were generally hostile to the West and its allies, and 
were accused of sponsoring terrorism and/or seeking to acquire or develop weapons of 
mass destruction.  In the last six months of the Clinton Adminstration,  policymakers 
discarded the term in favor of “state of concern.”  The Bush Administration re-adopted 
the term in 2001 and added hatred of the United States to the definition. 
 
C. PERCEPTION: THEORETICAL VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER 
These rogue nations do not pose a threat to the United States alone.  If they did, 
the notion of a rogue state could simply be dismissed as an enemy to the United States, or 
an ideological nemesis that does not subscribe to the ideals and freedoms upheld within 
our borders.  That, it seems, is not the case.  While the United States introduced the 
phrase, North Korea and others like it are not just at odds with the United States; they 
operate in a manner that has warranted the disapproval of the majority of nations.   This 
development points to something more complex than two nations with ideological and 
cultural differences.  Therefore we must briefly turn our attention to what it is that causes 
multiple nations to agree that another nation is a social outlier in the spectrum of 
international politics.  In Hedley Bull’s classic work, The Anarchical Society, he lays out 
the three major traditions of thought concerning the way in which the system of modern 
states is ordered.  In the realist view, derived from Hobbes, nations are in a constant state 
                                                 
6 National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, D.C.:  White House, 17 
(September 2002). (http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.htm.) 
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of war and interstate conflict is a zero-sum game.  In the Kantian or universalist tradition 
states work together in an effort to achieve one international community of mankind.7   
The Grotian tradition of internationalism sees international politics as taking place within 
the framework of an international society.  Bull himself claimed that the reality of the 
situation is a cross-section of all three.  He states that different periods in history and 
varied geographical theaters, as well as the beliefs of statesmen at the time creates a 
situation in which any one school of thought may take dominance over the others.8 
In realist doctrine cooperation only occurs on a temporary or short-term basis in 
the form of alliances or alignments and only when it serves a nation’s interest in gaining 
relative power.9  The fundamental problem encountered from the realist perspective 
always comes back to the security dilemma.  The more powerful a nation becomes, the 
more likely a counter-coalition or alliance of adversaries will form.10  States always want 
to maximize their security; therefore they seek power, provided gains do not jeopardize 
their security.  Relative gains are more important than absolute gains.11  Neoliberal 
institutionalism, a school of thought linked closely to the Grotian model, builds on both 
classical and structural/neo-realism yet differs on a very key issue.  Neoliberal 
institutionalism believes more in the power of institutions and international organizations 
for mediating disputes.12 
According to neoliberal institutionalism, interdependence determines what power 
is and how fungible it is across the range of interstate issues; politics, economics, culture, 
as well as military matters.  The role of international regimes and soft power i.e., 
economic sanctions and international pressure are more effective means of change and 
resolving conflict than force in a world of extensive or complex interdependence.13   
Neoliberal institutionalists believe parts of the world operate in a system of complex 
                                                 
7 Bull, Hedley. The Anarchical Society. 1977, p. 23. 
8 Ibid. p. 39. 
9 Axelrod, Robert.  The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books, 1984. pp. 3-24. 
10 Walt, Stephen. “Alliance formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security (Spring 
1985). 
11 Holsti, Ole R. “Theories of International Relations and Foreign Policy: Realism and Its Challengers,” in 
Charles W. Kegley Jr., ed., Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal 
Challenge. NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1995. pp. 35-65.  
12 Keohane, Robert. After Hegemony. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. pp. 78-105.  
13 Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye. Power and Interdependence. NY: Harper Collins Publishers, 2000.  
p. 34. 
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interdependence which is characterized by dense webs of interdependent relationships. 
These relationships can be vulnerable or sensitive in nature, and the nature of these 
relationships determines whether states will utilize international regimes and international 
institutions rather than force or coercion to resolve difficult situations.14   
Since Bull points us to look at reality rather than the ideal, let us turn our attention 
to the framework of the international system as it exists today.  Seemingly, the mere 
existence of an institution like the United Nations would incline most people to believe 
that the member nations, on at least some level, buy into a concept of an ‘international 
society’.   The Charter of the United Nations states that one of the purposes of the UN is 
to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to 
strengthen universal peace.15  Obviously the 1945 framers were interested in establishing 
an institution aimed at achieving, or at least maintaining peace in the international 
community.  Furthermore, the framers believed an international community or at least the 
potential for one existed. 
 The problem with looking historically at the reality of the international order is 
one can see evidence of the realist, Grotian, and Kantian traditions in practice.  In their 
work, Power and Interdependence, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye explain international 
relations as a spectrum with anarchical realism at one end and complex interdependence 
at the other.  The true nature of the international order is somewhere in the middle.16  The 
world often appears to be one of stark realism in times of war and more interdependent 
and cooperative in times of peace.  Very often nations that are new to the international 
order have a more difficult time living in the more complexly interdependent end of the 
spectrum; they often retain self-interested motivation of a realist view.  Therefore we 
must consider the perspective with which a particular state views the world.  North Korea 
possesses a unique view of the world that is not shared with the majority of the 
international order.         
 
                                                 
14 Grieco, Joseph M. “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal 
Institutionalism.” International Organization 42, 3 (Summer 1988). 
15 UN Charter, Chapter 1, Article 1.2. 
16 Keohane and Nye. p. 34. 
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D. INTERNATIONAL NORMS: AS DEFINED BY MAJOR POWERS 
Every war that has been fought has altered the existing world order in some 
fashion, but most students of international politics would argue that the current system is 
a result of the last world war and the subsequent “Cold War” that existed for the forty-
five years until the fall of the Soviet Union.  At the end of World War II, there were two 
nations that rose up and became the dominant forces in the global balance of power.  The 
struggle for power that resulted between the United States and the Soviet Union dictated 
the way the states interacted for the second half of the 20th century.17  The era of the Cold 
War was marked by a bi-polar system in which the United States and the USSR 
competed for power, as well as spheres of influence.18   This competition forced weaker 
nations to choose sides and ally with one or the other for security.   
 Just two years prior to the start of the Cold War, the United States, the Soviet 
Union, and the other victorious allied powers sat down in San Francisco in 1945 and 
created the framework for an international organization that would rely on the 
cooperation of “peace loving” nations in order to prevent major wars in the future.19  The 
basis of this newly created United Nations was an empirical understanding that peace and 
security were in the best interest of all nations.   The preamble to the United Nations 
Charter spelled out what the framers and member nations viewed to be their goals. The 
United Nations aimed to:  
…practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good 
neighbors, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and 
security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution 
of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common 
interest, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the 
economic and social advancement of all peoples.20 
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the international order became 
dominated by the United States, though rising powers like China and the European Union 
are increasingly challenging the U.S., politically as well as economically.  Regardless of 
                                                 
17 These two superpowers accordingly played a pivotal role in the separation of the Korean Peninsula, but 
that will be discussed later in this work. 
18 Iriye, Akira. The Cold War in Asia: A Historical Introduction, NY: Prentice-Hall, 1974. pp. 47-97. 
19 (http://www.un.org/members/index.html) 
20 UN Charter, Preamble. (http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/) 
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the competition for hegemonic dominance, the United Nations has remained as an 
assembly of sovereign nations with the pursuit of peace as the ultimate goal.  Though 
some may argue that in recent times its power and prestige have waned, the organization 
has remained intact.  Additionally, there are now a growing number of international and 
non-governmental organizations that are united by the belief that all people of all nations 
are entitled to peace, security, human rights, and economic and social freedom, 
independent of race, religion, or gender.21  The existence of such organizations and the 
increasing numbers of nations moving toward democratic systems of governance suggest 
that these aforementioned freedoms are the typical traits of “normal” nations.22  These so-
called "normal" nations are not limited to western democracies, or the major powers that 
dominate the UN Security Council.  The majority of industrialized and modernized 
societies encourage these freedoms.23  These “normal” nations that share these beliefs 
then in turn must constitute the benchmark for what state behavior is normal and what 
state behavior is rogue.    
 
E. HOW DOES NORTH KOREA STACK UP? 
The problem with the “international community” concept is that there is no 
centralized universal government or legitimate enforcement authority that dominates the 
international order.  Instead, states remain sovereign and only follow the rules of the 
system when they view them to be in their best interests.  Problems exist or states become 
problematic when individual state behavior is at odds with the communal theory of 
international order.  The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was defying the 
international community forty years prior to the fall of the Soviet Union.   
 The DPRK, while now internationally regarded as a rogue nation, was once a 
satellite of the Soviet Union and still remains in close contact with one of the other pillars 
of communism, the People’s Republic of China.  Yet, while inspired by these other 
nations and the teachings of Marx and Lenin, North Korea under the Kim dynasty has 
become its own ideological entity.  North Korean communism has outlasted other 
                                                 
21 Freedom House.org. (http://www.freedomhouse.org/aboutfh/index.htm) 
22 Since 1945, the number of UN Member Nations has grown from 51 to 195. The number of democracies 
has grown from 22 to 121.  The NPT has 188 parties.  The IAEA has 137 members. 
23 FreedomHouse.org. 
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communist nations and has not had to resort to the adoption of capitalism, as China is 
doing.  North Korea has been classified as a failing state, due to economic failure and the 
current nuclear crisis, but it has been able to survive the major fall of communism in 
Europe.24  Through isolationism and its unique brand of communism (Juche) the DPRK 
has managed to continue to live in the mindset of the Cold War.       
Juche ideology is the basic cornerstone of the communist party structure, party 
works, and government operations in North Korea.  North Korean leaders advocate juche 
as the only correct guiding ideology in their on-going revolutionary movement.25  The 
essence of juche is isolationism.  Kim reasoned that being surrounded by so many major 
powers -- each with histories of invading North Korea -- the country had little choice but 
to become as internally self-sufficient as possible.  The logical conclusion of juche was to 
almost completely close North Korea off economically, politically and culturally from the 
rest of the world.26   
 This isolationism was a clear manifestation of North Korea thumbing its nose at 
the rest of the world.  North Korea is preoccupied with state survival.27  North Korea 
continues to reject multi-national cooperation, and seeks to protect national identity and 
strength by preserving a country free from external influence.  The DPRK constitution 
states: “In building a socialist national culture, the State shall oppose the cultural 
infiltration of imperialism and any tendency to return to the past…”28  The DPRK 
believes that opening itself to the world would not only contaminate its ideology, but also 
make North Korea vulnerable to foreign dominance.  North Korea has opted to take a 
realist perspective in gauging the international system.  The state views the system as a 
constant state of war, which is reasonably understandable considering the fact that an 
inter-Korean truce was never declared at the end of the Korean War.  Therefore, in reality 
there has only been a fifty-year ceasefire and the dispute has never been formally settled.  
With this in mind, how could a nation such as North Korea see the world any other way?  
                                                 
24 Scalapino, Robert A. North Korea At a Crossroads. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1997.  
pp. 1-17.  
25 North Korea: A Country Study; Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992. pp. 41-43. 
26 Ibid. pp. 41-43. 
27 Reese, David. The Prospects for North Korea’s Survival. New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 1998. 
p. 14. 
28 DPRK Constitution, Chapter three, Article 41. 
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According to the state, it is still in the middle of a civil war, and matters of reunification 
and the disarming of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) are matters of domestic affairs, a 
sovereign issue to which the UN and the rest of the major powers have no legitimate 
position or authority.  International intervention constitutes a threat to North Korean 
sovereignty. 
 
F. CONFLICT BETWEEN ROGUE BEHAVIOR AND NORMAL NATIONS 
 A nation that does not conform with the norms of conventional economic and 
social systems is one thing, but human rights violation and nuclear proliferation truly 
make a rogue state a concern for the rest of the international system.  North Korea is one 
of the most tightly controlled countries in the world.29  The government denies its people 
even the most basic rights and civil liberties enjoyed elsewhere in the world.  North 
Korea runs a network of jails and prison camps that are notorious for their brutal 
treatment of inmates.  In 2001, the UN Human Rights Council called on Pyongyang to 
allow international human rights goups into the country to verify the “many allegations of 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and conditions and of inadequate medical care in 
reform institutions, prisons, and prison camps.”30 
In light of the grave state of the economy and the quality of life in the DPRK, the 
international community has stretched out its hands to attempt to help but North Korean 
diplomacy makes even giving aid a difficult process.  Donor states and agencies are 
concerned because the North will not give a verifiable account of its real needs.  These 
donors want to see a longer-term strategy beyond relying on charity.  Without greater 
openness, these concerns will lead to aid fatigue and will prompt donor states to place 
increasing pressure on the North to introduce economic reform.  There are signs that 
Pyongyang is aware of this problem, but it is doubtful that sufficient action will be 
taken.31 
                                                 
29 North Korea: Country Overview. (http://freedomhouse.org/) 
30 Ibid. 
31 Reese. p. 25-38. 
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 For the second time in the last ten years North Korea has openly declared the 
development of a nuclear weapons program.32  The DPRK seems to have used its 1991 
rejection of the nonproliferation regime as a means to gain rewards from the rest of the 
world.  In 1994, the U.S. created Agreed Framework put an end to the threat of war and 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons in North Korea.  However, in 2002 the DPRK again 
announced to the world that it was pursuing nuclear weaponization.  This time the DPRK 
demanded a bilateral non-aggression pact with the United States in exchange for the 
discontinuation of its nuclear program.33  The United States has refused and insists on 
settling the matter multilaterally.  
Currently North Korea is at the negotiating table for the “Six-Party Talks.”  These 
meetings involve China, South Korea, North Korea, Russia, Japan, and the United States, 
and are aimed at bringing a resolution to the nuclear crisis in North Korea.  However, one 
cannot help but be cautious and wonder when it will again pull away from the table.  Will 
North Korea escalate the crisis and perpetuate the problem rather than seek to resolve it.   
This work will illustrate that North Korea is an independent actor that both acts and 
reacts in a self-interested manner because that is how it views the system.  North Korea is 
isolated at times, yet engages the world when there is advantage to be gained.  The 
following chapters will chronologically detail the development of the country and how 
the DPRK chose to interact with the rest of the world throughout history.  This work does 
not endeavor to provide a prescription for how to deal with the current crisis, but rather 
presents the reality of the situation within which policymakers have operate to resolve a 
serious threat to global security. 
 Oscar Wilde tells us that education makes one rogue cleverer than the next.  If this 
is true then North Korea may be the cleverest pariah state that the world will have to deal 
with.  Born over fifty years ago, this half of the Korean nation has had ample time to 
observe and learn.  Since the end of the Second World War, the world has been learning 
to work together, to internationalize and to manage increasing globalization.  At the same 
time and pace, North Korea has been educating itself on how to compete with that same 
trend and continues to defy the norms of the international order.   
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II.  NORTH KOREAN DEVELOPMENT: PRE-WWII TO 1991 
The Korean peninsula sits in a strategically pivotal position in the middle of the 
Far East.  It is a landmass inhabited by two halves of one nation sharing the same race, 
language, culture, and history.  The current situation has resulted from a political split 
that the peninsula’s inhabitants did not have much of a say in at the time.  This chapter 
will introduce the historical circumstances that have left the peninsula divided.  It will 
give a historical view of Korean nationalism from the early 20th Century to fall of 
Communism in the early 1990s.   
Since its inception, North Korea has been at odds with one nation or another.  The 
country has never, in its entire history, existed in a state of peace.  Prior to the end of 
World War II, the peninsula was dominated by other regional powers.  When allied 
forces achieved victory in Asia and liberated the peninsula from Japanese occupation in 
1945, the Korean people did not experience genuine independence.  At the Yalta 
Agreement, just prior to the declared victory, the powers decided that the Soviet Union 
would accept Japanese surrender north of the 38th parallel and the United States would 
accept the surrender south of that line.  Under this agreement, the U.S. and the USSR 
were to aid the Korean people in developing a free and independent nation.  The 
agreement stated that the two liberating powers would hold the peninsula in “trusteeship” 
until the Korean nation was ready to rule itself.34     
The Korean people were very dissatisfied with this outcome.  Factionalism and 
dissention grew under U.S. trusteeship in the south.  However, the north rallied around 
the Soviet sponsored communist party and developed a strong central government under 
the leadership of the Soviet trained, Kim Il Sung.  The United States and the USSR did 
not agree to the terms of Korean independence and no substantial plan was ever devised.  
In 1947, at the request of the United States, a United Nations (UN) Commission 
intervened and attempted to establish a nation-wide free election throughout the 
peninsula.  The Soviet supported communists in the north refused to allow the 
commission to enter the northern territory and claimed that a secret election had selected 
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Kim Il Sung as the leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).  The 
south held a UN sponsored election and elected Syngman Rhee as president of the 
Republic of Korea.  Both governments claimed to be the legitimate government of the 
entire peninsula.   After several minor skirmishes, in 1950, North Korea invaded the 
south in an effort to unify the peninsula under a communist government.  The conflict 
involved the military forces of China, the Soviet Union, the United States and fifteen UN 
member nations.  The result was a containment of North Korean aggression, but the 
lasting effect was the creation of a North Korea that continues to pursue an autarkic 
agenda that keeps the country at ideological odds with the rest of the world.  This 
constant turmoil has left North Korea with an awkward sense of identity and an even 
more dedicated sense of self-reliance.     
 
A.  OCCUPATION OF AND DIVISION OF KOREAN PENINSULA    
1. Korea before WWII 
For centuries prior to the modernization of Korea, the Korean identity was tightly 
tied to the Confucian ethic and more specifically to China.  China was much larger, had a 
greater military strength and had more advanced technology than Korea.35  The adoption 
of Chinese culture was more than simply an expression of submission to China; it was an 
indispensable condition of being civilized in the East Asian context.  This situation 
continued until the inroads of Western civilization substantially altered the political and 
cultural map of Asia in the latter part of the nineteenth century.36   
Despite this status as a vassal country, Korea was still able to retain a distinct 
identity until the latter part of the nineteenth century.  The kingdoms of Korea were quite 
successful in keeping China from annexing the peninsula.  Toward the end of the 
nineteenth century, the reigning Qing Dynasty in China was clearly on the decline and 
the other powers in the region were poised to take advantage of the situation.37  Japan 
won victories in both the first Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War.  As a 
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result, both nations signed treaties with Japan and acknowledged Japan’s political and 
economic dominance over the Korean peninsula.38 
During the occupation of the Korean peninsula, Japan was instrumental in 
building up infrastructure, especially the roadways, and rail systems.  At the same time, 
Japanese colonialism was also the instrument that helped tear down all elements of 
culture that could be called Korean.39  Japan ruled the peninsula with an iron fist and 
attempted to force Koreans to assimilate into Japanese culture.  These assimilation 
attempts went as far as to make people adopt Japanese names, convert to the Shinto 
religion, and forbid Koreans to use the Korean language in schools and businesses.  Until 
1921, Koreans were not allowed to publish their own newspapers or to organize political 
or intellectual groups.40   
Prior to the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910, the Japanese government 
forced King Kojong, the last monarch of the Yi Dynasty, to abdicate the throne in 1907.  
The king’s weaker son was raised to the throne and was married to a Japanese woman in 
order to begin the assimilation process.  Japan then placed Japanese military officials as 
governors that reported directly back to the Japanese prime ministers.  For all intents and 
purposes, Koreans were made into subjects of the Japanese emperor; however, Koreans 
were treated as conquered people, rather than citizens of equal status.41 
Japanese oppression led to the beginnings of a nationalist movement in Korea.42  
In 1919, student demonstrations were held in Japan and the Proclamation of 
Independence was held by a small group of leaders in Seoul on March 1, 1919.  In the 
wake of this protest movement, Japan began to grant more concessions to the people of 
Korea.  This brief glimpse at social reform gave way to the organization of labor unions 
and other socio-political groups that would play a larger role after the liberation in 
1945.43  However, the student protests and labor movement were quickly crushed in the 
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1930s.  During this time period, many militarists rose to the forefront of the Japanese 
government and political spectrum.   
The Japanese government pursued economic practices that had very little benefit 
to the Koreans.44  Japan’s initial colonial policy was to increase agricultural production in 
Korea to meet Japan’s growing need for rice.  Virtually all industries were owned either 
by Japanese-based corporations or by corporations in Korea.45  A large portion of the 
farmland was taken over by the Japanese and an increasing proportion of Korean farmers 
either became sharecroppers or migrated to Japan or Manchuria.  In the 1920s and 1930s, 
socialist writers began to influence the development of literature.  Japanese authorities 
were particularly harsh on these individuals and attempted to suppress any literature of 
socially revolutionary nature.  The Japanese colonial occupation further victimized 
Koreans by destroying their economy.  When Japan launched the second Sino-Japanese 
War against China, in 1937, Japan imposed a wartime policy that mobilized the entire 
Korean nation for the cause of the war.  The government enlisted Koreans to fight in the 
Japanese army as volunteers in 1938, and as conscripts in 1943.46  Service in the Japanese 
army not only reduced the availability of labor in Korea at that time, but significantly 
reduced the size of the labor force for the future.  As a means of survival, many Koreans 
submitted to and complied with the oppressive rule and at least superficially accepted the 
colonial government.  The reaction to these so-called “collaborators” became a sensitive 
and sometimes violent issue following the liberation in 1945.47 
2. The Trusteeship 
On August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union declared war against Japan and launched an 
invasion of Manchuria and Korea.  The United States dropped atomic bombs on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and August 9, respectively, leaving a depleted and 
defeated Japanese force searching for an end to the war.48  The Japanese ultimately 
surrendered unconditionally on 15 August 1945.  At the Cairo Conference of December 
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1943, Japan was stripped of all the territories it had acquired since the beginning of its 
expansionist drive abroad in 1904.  All Allied nations, including the United States, China, 
Britain and the Soviet Union agreed Korea would be a free and independent nation.49  
The United States and the Soviet Union had decided at the Yalta Conference in February 
1945 that Korea would be placed under an international “trusteeship” for an indefinite 
amount of time after its liberation in 1945.  The Korean populace opposed the agreement, 
but were left with little other choice.50  Initially, the agreement had no formal framework, 
yet, with Soviet forces deployed on the ground in Korea in August 1945, the United 
States felt compelled create a plan quickly.  President Harry S. Truman proposed to 
Marshal Josef V. Stalin a division along the 38th parallel.  They agreed was to create a 
trusteeship, during which a Korean provisional government would prepare for full 
independence.  They also decided to form a Joint United States-Soviet commission to 
assist in organizing a single “provisional Korean democratic government.”51  
Prior to the deployment of U.S. provisional forces to South Korea, the Koreans 
south of the 38th parallel had created their own provisional government called the Central 
People’s Committee, and proclaimed the establishment of the Korean People’s Republic 
on September 6, 1945.  The United States refused to recognize the Korean government 
until an agreement could be reached between the major powers.  The U.S. forces further 
confused the people of Korea by disbanding all popular and social committees, and 
imposed direct rule with a provisional government comprised of military personnel.52  
This only alienated the Korean population. 
Despite the fact that the U.S. had maintained a relationship with the ruling 
dynasty prior to Japanese colonization, in 1945 the West viewed Korea as a very remote 
land.  Little was known about the peninsula accept for what information a small number 
of missionaries and business men had brought back with them over the years.53  U.S. 
policymakers were unaware of the strategic potential of the Korean peninsula at this time, 
but were forced to deal with the confusion and stalemate that existed in the American-
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Soviet joint commission.54  U.S. policymakers argued that the four powers, including 
China, should oversee the trusteeship with the eventual goal being Korean independence.  
As the trusteeship began to take shape the Koreans who were anticipating immediate 
independence felt humiliated and began to look at the American troops less as liberators 
and more as an occupying force.55  The U.S. military government relied on the 
conservative elements of society for support and advice in ruling the country.  The 
Korean Communist Party, which had been the driving force behind the creation of the 
Central People’s Committee, built up a strong base of followers from the working class, 
farmers, and students in the south as well as the north.  The Party originally supported of 
an independent Korea; it openly changed its view in favor of the trusteeship in the early 
part of 1946.  However, the Party was being directed by the Soviets in the north and 
consequently was opposed to the U.S. military government.  The United States attempted 
to bolster support by starting a movement to unify the centrists in the south behind the 
U.S. military government.  This had little favorable results and only served to divide the 
political left from the political right even further.56  This tension eventually led to violent 
uprisings between political factions, not only over ideological views, but over the 
trusteeship as well.  The United States utilized its military forces on the ground in Korea 
to attempt to maintain peace until the international issue with the Soviet Union was 
resolved.   
In 1946, the U.S. military government established the South Korean Legislative 
Assembly as a provisional assembly to draft laws that could be used as the basis for 
political, economic, and social reforms.  Leftist political organizations consolidated under 
the South Korean Worker’s Party and ignored the assembly.  The Korean Democratic 
Party, comprised of conservative factions, also opposed the assembly because their 
chosen leaders were not given positions.  There were many conservative members on the 
council, but the majority were moderates placed there by the U.S. military government. 
This political tension only exacerbated a downward spiraling situation.  During 
the Japanese occupation, the Korean economy was directly tied in as an integral cog in 
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the wheels of the Japanese empire.57  Korean production and agriculture were closely 
linked to Japan and Manchuria.  The line arbitrarily created post-WWII between north 
and south rendered the south unable the build up a self-sufficient economy.58  Most of the 
heavy industry in Korea, to include the chemical plants and the production of fertilizer, 
were in the north.  Also the power and rail capabilities in the south were vitally 
dependant on outside support.   In the midst of the confusion and building tension on the 
peninsula, the Soviets continued to consolidate power in north of the 38th parallel.  By 
1947, it began to look to the United States government as though South Korea and Japan 
would be the only countries in Northeast Asia that would not be under communist 
control.  As the uncertainty and confusion that accompanied the formation of the 
trusteeship increased, so did the tension between the United States and the Soviet Union.   
The United States had originally allocated 500 million U.S. dollars to rebuilding 
the South Korean economy.  It now turned to the United Nations for a solution to the 
deepening division between the two halves of the Korean peninsula.59  In November of 
1947, the UN General Assembly recognized Korea’s claim to independence and began 
preparations for the establishment of a government and the withdrawal of occupation 
forces.  A UN Temporary Commission on Korea was set up to supervise the election of a 
Korean national assembly.  The Soviet Union refused to allow the UN commission to 
enter the northern area of the peninsula and denounced the resolution.60  A reunified, 
independent Korea was becoming less likely.   
Korean political leaders in the south decided to pursue immediate independence at 
the risk of indefinite division.61  The National Assembly, elected in May of 1948, adopted 
a constitution setting up a presidential form of government with a four-year term for the 
president.  Syngman Rhee, who returned from exile in 1945 and was the formidable 
leader of the moderate sect, was elected president and the Republic of Korea was 
proclaimed on August 15, 1948.  Four days later, the communist controlled north shut off 
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power to the south.  Less than a month later, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
was established in the north.  The new communist regime was led by Premier Kim Il 
Sung.  It claimed authority over the entire peninsula based on the election held in the 
north and a supposed secret election held in the south.62  In June of 1950 the North 
Korean army invaded the south to secure their claim.                                      
3. Korean War 
The South Korean government was still in its infancy when North Korea attacked.  
The South’s military force, to say the least, was not a formidable one.  After squashing a 
pro-communist rebellion in 1948, the military was purged, leaving it severely 
weakened.63  At the time of the invasion, the South Korean army consisted of less than 
1,000 men with no tanks, no heavy artillery, or combat planes, a coast guard of only 
4,000 and a police force of approximately 45,000 men.64   
North Korea, on the other hand, was prepared for a war and had been preparing 
since the liberation in 1945.  The communists in North Korea had built a powerful and 
skilled military machine under the direction of the Soviet “trusteeship.”65  In October of 
1945, the Soviets created a regional Five Province Administrative Bureau, which became 
the Korean People’s Committee in 1947.  The strength of the communist party was 
expanded in August of 1946 when all leftist political organizations were incorporated into 
the North Korean Worker’s Party.  The North Koreans also beefed up the armed forces in 
strength and capabilities.  Between 1946 and 1949, North Korea sent at least 10,000 
Korean youths to the Soviet Union for military training.  The nation also sent two 
divisions of 40,000 troops to China to serve in the Chinese civil war.  These divisions 
served and trained under Chinese communists from 1945 to 1949.66  By 1950, North 
Korean forces reached almost 200,000 troops, organized into ten infantry divisions, one 
tank division, and one air force division.  Soviet equipment, including automatic 
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weapons, tanks, and planes, began to arrive in North Korea in early 1950 and served to 
reinforce the growing strength of the military complex.67      
North Korean forces were met with little resistance and captured the southern 
capital of Seoul within three days.  In just two short months the South Korean forces 
were confined to the southeastern corner of the peninsula -- a territory roughly 80 miles 
long and 55 miles wide.  The United States had completely withdrawn from Korea in 
1948, except for a few military advisors, and had removed Korea from within the U.S. 
defense perimeter.68  With the victory of the communists in China in 1949, the United 
States was hesitant to enter a war with communism on the Korean peninsula.  However, 
many in the administration and State Department professed a policy of containment, and 
felt that inaction would be viewed as acceptance of communist aggression elsewhere in 
the world.69  On June 26, 1950 President Truman ordered the deployment of U.S. forces 
to support the South Korean forces.  The U.S. invoked the UN Security Council to aid in 
the intervention.  By early August, the tide of the war had changed.  Chinese volunteers 
had to intervene in October in order help the North Koreans maintain control over the 
northern territory.70  The war continued until July 27, 1953 when a ceasefire agreement 
was signed in P’anmunjom.  By the time of the conclusion in 1953, the war had involved 
forces from China and the Soviet Union, as well fifteen member-nations of the United 
Nations. 
Despite the relatively short duration of the war, the conflict left a lasting scar on 
the peninsula and the whole Asian theater.  The destruction and casualties on both sides 
were horrendous.  Even more lasting than the physical destruction was the fact that the 
war solidified the division between the two Koreas.71  The anti-communist sentiment in 
South Korea grew dramatically.72  Korea became the focal point for the Cold War and the 
launching point East-West conflict.  U.S. troops remained in South Korea and Chinese 
‘volunteers’ remained in North Korea.  








B. NORTH KOREAN DEVELOPMENT DURING THE COLD WAR 
1. Communist Party Development: Chinese and Soviet Influence 
Prior to the war in December of 1950, the Workers Party consisted of 600,000 
members.  After the war, Kim Il Sung blamed his people for the U.S. success in the war, 
and purged the party of 450, 000 members.  He then rebuilt it from the ground up.73  
During the first few years after the war, Korean communists regrouped and focused on 
building a strong regime.  They wanted to create a rigid system with organized 
factionalism.74  The ultimate desire was to create a party that could be thought of as the 
successor to the Yi Dynasty.  It was an effort to turn Korean Communism into Korean 
Nationalism.    
The construction of the Communist Party in the DPRK differed from that of its 
Soviet patriarch and more closely resembled that of its Chinese neighbor.  The North 
Korean Workers Party wanted to create a party including approximately ten percent of 
the population.  This way, all citizens would be mindful of the fact that a party member 
would likely be in the near vicinity, watching.  Furthermore, all citizens would want to be 
a party member.  In the early stages, many party members had Soviet military experience.  
Many party members were military and as mentioned in the previous section, much of the 
military was trained in either the Soviet Union or the Chinese Civil War.  Even the Party 
leader, Kim Il Sung, trained in the Soviet Union.  While the theory of Marxism-Leninism 
came from the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union directed North Korea during the 
trusteeship, the Chinese application of communism became much more appealing to 
North Koreans.75  Prior to the Sino-Soviet split, Koreans were becoming familiar with 
Mao’s version of Asian communism.   
2. North Korean Adaptation of Communist Ideology  
North Korea’s Communist Party shared a great deal of culture, history, and 
tradition with its Chinese brother.  And while their paths to power were different, during 
the first two decades, their forms of communism and the manner in which they ruled 
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seemed very similar to one another.76  Both nations conducted political experiments and 
developed personality cults around their leaders.77  The Party lines were very similar for 
the first two decades and did not truly begin to diverge until the 1970s.78   
The two nations shared long and deep-rooted histories of despotism, as well as the 
traditions of Confucianism and Buddhism.  The long-standing tradition of imperial rule 
was destroyed in Korea and weakened in China in the late 19th Century by foreign 
conquest.  Only Japanese conquest was widespread in Korea and in China and created 
lasting influences in both the countries.  Asian Communism carried with it these 
historical legacies and combined them with historical legacies with Marxism-Leninism to 
develop unique versions of communism.  
The two countries’ geographic proximity, shared history and ideology have meant 
the significantly smaller of the two, North Korea, has been heavily influenced by what 
has occurred in China.  This has meant that North Korea has often copied a change in 
policy or innovation by China though this has by no means all been one way.79  North 
Korea's Flying Horse movement is comparable to China's Great Leap Forward while 
some elements of the North Korean collectivization were copied by China.  Up to the late 
1980s, North Korea did however have the Soviet Union as a strategic counterweight to 
limit Beijing's influence.  Having fought to protect North Korean communism once, it has 
always been unlikely that while China remained communist it would let communism 
come to an end in its neighbor.  Thus to a certain degree North Korean communism had 
been supported by its Chinese neighbor since the time of the Korean War.80 
Until the 1970s the Chinese Communist Party and the Korean Workers Party in 
general espoused a similar general ideology, that of Marxism-Leninism.  The communist 
principle of democratic centralism was applied in the two counties.81  Economically this 
meant that the state not only owned the means of production but also centralized 
economic planning, investment, and distribution.  Power was concentrated in the hands of 
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the respective parties.  All party members and party organizations were expected to 
unconditionally support and carry out the party line.  Comparable political structures 
were also erected in the two countries.  The highest organizations of state the North 
Korean People's Assembly and the Chinese National People's Congress were run along 
the same lines.82  In principle, membership of these organs and almost all party positions 
were elected.  In reality they were anything but as there was usually only one candidate to 
vote for on the ballot paper.83  Therefore, far from representing the proletariat and 
peasants the parties became totalitarian regimes run by select groups of people.  These 
groups did not allow other political ideas or ideologies to circulate except for the 
government line.  The struggle for power within the ruling clique was intense in both 
parties, resulting in factions developing and clashing.84  Factionalism died down only 
when one man in each country attained absolute power, Mao Zedong in China and Kim Il 
Sung in North Korea.   
Like Mao Zedong, Kim Il Sung was very much a leader of the masses, making 
frequent visits to factories and the countryside.  He sent cadres down to local levels to 
help policy implementation and to solicit local opinion.  He required small-group 
political study and so-called criticism and self-criticism.  He used periodic campaigns to 
mobilize people for production or education, and encouraging soldiers to engage in 
production in good "people's army" fashion.85  Throughout the 1960s, Kim Il Sung 
expanded his sphere of influence and mobilized support by purging Soviet and Chinese 
supporters from the ranks of the Korean Workers Party.  This hurt the country 
economically.  As Kim forced foreign influence out, foreign investment went with it.  
North Korea only relaxed its position against foreign powers when its failing economy 
required support from the Soviet Union in the mid 1960s.  North Korea was still 
confronting with the United States and South Korea.  The DPRK needed to emphasize 
self-reliance and strengthen domestic political solidarity.  Sacrifice, austerity, unity and 
patriotism became the major themes of the Party ideology.   
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3. North Korean Divergence from Communist Powers 
Chinese and North Korean communism began to diverge significantly only in the 
1970s.  In 1971, during the Sino-Soviet rift, China announced its intention to normalize 
its foreign relations.  This policy change was epitomized by Richard Nixon's visit to 
China in 1972.86  Under Mao, economic changes occurred at the margins to recover from 
the ravages of the Cultural Revolutions.  Deng Xiaopeng’s new economic program 
reforms initially included market-style reforms, de-collectivization and an open door to 
foreign investment.  The first reforms were a dramatic success.  Efficiency in agriculture 
increased rapidly in subsequent years.  These significantly and permanently changed 
Chinese communism.  The Party's main newspaper the People's Daily made it official 
when it declared in 1981 that Marxism-Leninism did not provide a problem to every 
economic, social and political problem in the world.87   
This was heresy to the North Koreans and the vast majority of orthodox 
communists the world over.  The Korean Workers Party did make some limited attempts 
to attract foreign investment but with little success.  It was thus further convinced that 
juche, the North Korean ideology of self-reliance, was North Korea's most appropriate 
form of development.88  Deng's reforms Chinese communism has come to look more and 
more like communism in name only and created a deep divide with the strand of 
communism the North Koreans continue to practice.89 
Marxism did not present a political model for achieving socialism, only an opaque 
set of prescriptions.90  This political opacity opened the way for the development of a 
communist ideology that fit the indigenous culture of the Korean people.  The strongest 
foreign influence on North Korea's leadership had been the Chinese communist model.   
The North Korean system differed from China and the Soviet Union in its treatment of 
the intellectual class.  Rather than purge the intellectuals, the North Korean Worker's 
Party embraced, elevated, and eventually manipulated them.  These intellectuals spread 
the party principles and linked the juche concept with Marxist Leninism.  The symbol of 







the Korean Workers Party is a hammer and sickle with a superimposed writing brush, 
symbolizing the "three-class alliance" of workers, peasants, and intellectuals.  Unlike 
Mao's China, the Kim regime never exterminated intellectuals as a potential "new class" 
of subversives; instead, it has followed an inclusive policy toward them.  This may be 
due to the fact that postwar Korea was in general short of intellectuals and experts, and 
North Korea particularly so, as so many left the north for the south between 1945 and 
1950.91  For P'yongyang, the term “intellectual” refers to experts and technocrats, of 
which there are exceedingly few in North Korea in 1947.  North Korea's political system 
is thus a mixture of Marxism-Leninism, Korean nationalism, and indigenous political 
needs.  The term that perhaps best captures this system is socialist corporatism.92  
Socialist corporatist doctrine has always preferred an organic metaphor to the liberal, 
pluralist conception of politics: a corporal body politic rather than a set of diverse groups 
and interests.93  In fact by the late 1970s, mention of Marxist-Leninism had all but 
disappeared from literature and newsprint.   
 
C. JUCHE IDEOLOGY: NORTH KOREAN SELF-RELIANCE 
North Korea's goal of tight unity at home has produced a remarkable political 
system, unprecedented in any existing communist regime.  Kim Il Sung is not just the 
"iron-willed, ever-victorious commander," the "respected and beloved Great Leader"; he 
also is the "head and heart" of the body politic, and even "the supreme brain of the 
nation".94   
The juche ideology and Kim were almost synonymous terms.  Kim introduced the 
term in December 1955, when he stressed the idea that there needed to be a Korea-
centered revolution, and North Korea would no longer pursue a revolution that benefits 
other nations.  Kim Il Sung introduced this ideology as an attempt to create a monolithic 
system of authority that was under his exclusive control.  The juche was a psychological 
tool of sorts used to alienate foreign-oriented dissenters and remove them from the center 
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of power.95  Despite the dominance of this ideology in the mid 1950s, it was not accepted 
overnight.  During the first ten years of North Korean existence, Marxist-Leninism was 
the dominant doctrinal authority and nationalism was toned down in deference to the 
Party line in the Soviet Union and China.96   
In an effort to find a national identity, North Korea has adopted the juche and 
hails it as being the purest form of communism.  North Korea is assumed to be the center 
of the world, radiating outward the rays of the juche.  The worldview is one of concentric 
circles with Kim Il Sung at the center.  The nature of society is based firmly in the family 
structure with everything pointing to Kim Il Sung as the paternal figure.  The outer circle 
of this model distinguishes the Korean from the foreign, a reflection of the extraordinary 
ethnic and linguistic unity of the Korean and Korea’s history of exclusionism.97 
Once his power was consolidated, Kim put into practice his theory of Juche or 
self-reliance.  He reasoned that being surrounded by so many major powers each with 
histories of invading North Korea the country had little choice but to become as internally 
self-sufficient as possible.  The logical conclusion of juche was North Korea's almost 
complete isolation economically, political and culturally from the rest of the world.  Even 
at this height his cult was, however, nothing compared with that of Kim's.  First and 
foremost, Kim's cult was always more of a family cult one in which even his mother 
Kang Ban-suk was given the honorary title of the "Mother of Korea".  Through North 
Korea's education system and mass media Kim set himself up as a role model for all age 
groups in the country.  With the aid of a strong personality cult, Kim dominated the 
politics and perverted the communism of North Korea.   
The Korean Workers Party often is referred to as the "Mother" party, party 
affiliation is said to provide "blood ties," the leader always is "fatherly," and the country 
is one big "family."  Kim Il Sung is said to be paternal, devoted, and benevolent, and the 
people presumably respond with loyalty, obedience, and mutual love.  North Korean 
ideology buries Marxism-Leninism under the ubiquitous, always-trumpeted juche 
ideology.  By the 1970s, juche had triumphed fundamentally over Marxism-Leninism as 
                                                 




the basic ideology of the regime, but the emphases were there from the beginning.  Juche 
is the core of North Korean nationalism.  
Juche ideology is the basic cornerstone of the communist party construction, party 
works, and government operations in North Korea.  Juche is held as the essence of what 
has been officially called Kim Il Sung Juui (Kim Il Sung-ism) since April 1974.  Juche is 
also claimed as “the present-day Marxist-Leninism”.98  North Korean leaders advocate 
juche ideology as the only correct guiding ideology in their on-going revolutionary 
movement.99  The succession in North Korea also followed the family structure.  Kim Il 
Sung’s son Kim Jung Il began to gain a central role in government as early as the early 
1970s.  In 1980, he was named the semi-official ‘heir designate’ to his father with the 
title ‘Dear and Beloved Leader,’ and in August of 1984 was officially as successor to his 
father.  Kim Jung Il’s birth was in terms suggestive of the virgin birth of Christ; he was 
‘the guiding star rose on the Peaktu ridge’, whose rays are such that, once exposed to 
them, ‘everything on earth will revive, youth will spring up and vigor will pour forth; the 
dead will rise, the elderly will grow young and the ignorant will awaken.’100   
Kim Jung Il was very much his father’s son and continued the trend away from 
traditional Marxism.  Little in his actions or thought was profound or original, and he 
continued on the same non-conformist path his father had created.  A former senior North 
Korean diplomat named Ko Yon Phan, who served as Kim Il Sung's interpreter, defected 
to South Korea in May of 1991.  He argues that North Korea ceased to be socialist in the 
late 1960s and has been gradually turned into a patrimonial Kim domain.101  Combined, 
with the fact that the country has sustained a military standoff with the United States and 
South Korea, this ideology has resulted in a very peculiar society.  The pressure resulting 
from this confrontation, and continuing fear of renewed, possibly nuclear conflict, helped 
to sustain the monolithic unity of the regime and the state.102 
 
 
                                                 
98 Oberdorfer. 
99 North Korea: A Country Study; Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992. 




D. NORTH KOREAN FOREIGN RELATIONS  
North Korea's relationship with the South has formed much of its post-World War 
II history and still drives much of its foreign policy.  North and South Korea have had a 
difficult and acrimonious relationship from the Korean War period.  In recent years, 
North Korea has pursued a mixed policy.  It has sought to develop economic relations 
with South Korea and win the support of the South Korean public for greater North-South 
engagement.  At the same time, it has continued to denounce the ROK's security 
relationship with the United States and maintained a threatening conventional force 
posture on the DMZ and in adjacent waters.  During the postwar period, both Korean 
governments have repeatedly affirmed their desire to reunify the Korean Peninsula, but 
until 1971 the two governments had no direct, official communications or other 
contact.103  
1. Reunification Efforts Since 1971  
In August 1971, North and South Korea held talks through their respective Red 
Cross societies with the aim of reuniting the many Korean families separated following 
the division of Korea and the Korean War.  In July 1972, the two sides agreed to work 
toward peaceful reunification and an end to the hostile atmosphere prevailing on the 
peninsula.  Officials exchanged visits, and regular communications were established 
through a North-South coordinating committee and the Red Cross.  
However, these initial contacts broke down in 1973.  That year South Korean President 
Park Chung Hee announced that the South would seek separate entry into the United 
Nations. That same year South Korean intelligence service kidnapped the domestic 
opposition leader Kim Dae-Jung.  There was no other significant contact between North 
and South Korea until 1984.  
Dialogue was renewed in September 1984, when South Korea accepted the 
North's offer to provide relief goods to victims of severe flooding in South Korea.  Red 
Cross talks to address the plight of separated families resumed, as did talks on economic 
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and trade issues and parliamentary-level discussions.  However, the North unilaterally 
suspended all talks in January 1986, arguing that the annual U.S.-South Korea "Team 
Spirit" military exercise was inconsistent with dialogue.  There was a brief flurry of 
negotiations that year on co-hosting the upcoming 1988 Seoul Olympics, which ended in 
failure.  In 1987 North Korean agents bombed a South Korean commercial aircraft (KAL 
858).  
In July 1988, South Korean President Roh Tae Woo called for new efforts to 
promote North-South exchanges, family reunification, inter-Korean trade, and contact in 
international forums.  Roh followed up this initiative in a UN General Assembly speech 
in which South Korea offered for the first time to discuss security matters with the North. 
Initial meetings that grew out of Roh's proposals started in September 1989.  In 
September 1990, the first of eight prime minister-level meetings between North Korean 
and South Korean officials took place in Seoul.  The prime ministerial talks resulted in 
two major agreements: the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges, and 
Cooperation (the "Basic Agreement") and the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula (the "Joint Declaration").  
The Basic Agreement, signed on December 13, 1991, called for reconciliation and 
nonaggression and established four joint commissions.  These commissions, on North-
South reconciliation, North-South military affairs, North-South economic exchanges and 
cooperation, and North-South social and cultural exchange, were to work out the 
specifics for implementing the basic agreement.  Subcommittees to examine specific 
issues were created, and liaison offices were established in Panmunjom, but in the fall of 
1992 the process came to a halt because of rising tension over North Korea's nuclear 
program.  
The Joint Declaration on denuclearization was signed on December 31, 1991.  It 
disallowed both sides from testing, manufacturing, producing, receiving, possessing, 
storing, deploying, or using nuclear weapons and forbade the possession of nuclear 
reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.  A procedure for inter-Korean inspection 
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was to be organized and a North-South Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) was 
mandated to verify the denuclearization of the peninsula.104  
On January 30, 1992, the DPRK finally signed a nuclear safeguards agreement 
with the IAEA, as it had pledged to do in 1985 when acceding to the nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty.  This safeguards agreement allowed IAEA inspections to begin in 
June 1992.  In March 1992, the JNCC was established in accordance with the Joint 
Declaration, but subsequent meetings failed to reach agreement on the main issue of 
establishing a bilateral inspection regime.  
 
E. SUMMARY 
 The DPRK developed as a state under the veil of communism and the Cold War, 
however, the state that resulted was very different from other communist states. The 
juche ideology that was embraced in North Korea made this state a rogue within the 
communist bloc long before the introduction of western norms.  The Kim Il Sung 
developed doctrine embraced a principle of self-reliance for the state, but the people 
themselves became extremely beholden to Kim himself.  Other communist nations had 
charismatic leaders, but juche took on a religious, almost cult-like identity that centered 
itself around the Kim family.  The use of the family was another aspect that made North 
Korean communism an anomaly.  The fact that Kim Jung Il replaced his father as the 
leader of the nation, makes North Korea more akin to a dynastic autocracy than a 
communist regime.  The Kim family embodies a patrimonial ideology for the people of 
North Korea.   
 Throughout the Cold War, Kim Il Sung used isolationism as well as playing 
Beijing and Moscow against each other as a way to maintain enough independence to   
develop his cult of self-reliance.  The DPRK even withdrew from its communist allies 
when self-interest was at stake.  North Korea, under the leadership of the Kim Dynasty 
spent four decades developing a state identity that contradicts the ideas of cooperative 
engagement and rejects the notion of an international community.  Adherence to this 
ideology and maintenance of this mind-set has created problems for this hermitic state in 
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dealing with the rest of the world.  The concepts of limited engagement and self-reliance 
stand in direct contradiction of the international order’s increasing movement toward 
interdependence and multinational cooperation.  Conversely, the norms of an 
international society subvert the foundations of the juche ideology.  This development 





III. NORTH KOREAN MATURATION: THE FALL OF 
    COMMUNISM TO THE PRESENT NUCLEAR CRISIS 
In 1989, the Kim regime felt abandoned by the rest of the communist bloc.  One 
by one, the former Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe chose to reject their 
communist regimes and open themselves to democracy and capitalism.  Having 
previously moved away from the ongoing reforms of Chinese communism, North Korea 
under the Kim regime progressed further into isolationism.105  In fact, the destruction of 
other communist regimes was used to the advantage of the Korean Workers Party.  With 
these failures elsewhere in the world and the perseverance of the regime in North Korea, 
the Party was able to tout its conviction that the juche ideology was the purest form of 
communism.106  Kim Il Sung condemned the other leaders and their systems for falling 
prey to the evils of capitalism.  This line of rhetoric sounded remarkably similar to the 
domino theory discussions of containment in the 1940s.  Ironically, now this style of 
propaganda was coming from the other side.   
After the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the DPRK did 
make several attempts to interact with the rest of the world.  In 1991, North Korea joined 
the United Nations.  At this time it appeared as though North Korea was following the 
lead of other post-communist nations and integrating into the existing international 
society.  However, the DPRK has since demonstrated that it is only willing to interact 
with other countries on its own terms.   
North Korean initiatives during the 1990s represented the most promising signs of 
change on the peninsula in decades.  Whether by desire or by necessity, the DPRK finally 
appeared to be responding to the long-standing concerns of the United States, South 
Korea, and the other major powers.  Equally important, Pyongyang seemed to have 
abandoned its policy of playing Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo off one another by  
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addressing the concerns of one while ignoring those of the other two.107  For the first 
time, the North was actively engaging all three capitals simultaneously. 
 
A. NORTH KOREA’S LIMITED ENGAGEMENT108 
Throughout the Cold War, North Korea balanced its relations with China and the 
Soviet Union in order to extract the maximum benefit from the relationships at minimum 
political cost.  In the 1970s and early 1980s the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between the United States and China, the Soviet-backed Vietnamese occupation of 
Cambodia, and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan strained relations between China 
and the Soviet Union and, in turn, complicating North Korea's relations with its two 
major communist allies.  North Korea tried to avoid becoming entangled in the Sino-
Soviet split, obtaining aid from both the Soviet Union and China and trying to avoid 
dependence on either.  Following Kim Il Sung's 1984 visit to Moscow, there was an 
improvement in Soviet-DPRK relations, resulting in renewed deliveries of Soviet 
weaponry to North Korea and increases in economic aid.  
The establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and the Soviet 
Union in 1990 and the PRC in 1992 put a serious strain on relations between North Korea 
and its traditional allies.  Moreover, the fall of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 
and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 resulted in a significant drop in 
communist aid to North Korea.  Despite these changes and its past reliance on this 
military and economic assistance, North Korea continued to proclaim a militantly 
independent stance in its foreign policy in accordance with its official ideology of juche, 
or self-reliance.  
North Korea has maintained membership in a variety of multilateral 
organizations.  Both North and South Korea became parties to the Biological Weapons 
Convention in 1987.  It became a member of the UN in September 1991.  North Korea 
also belongs to the Food and Agriculture Organization; the International Civil Aviation 
Organization; the International Postal Union; the UN Conference on Trade and 
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Development; the International Telecommunications Union; the UN Development 
Program; the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the World Health 
Organization; the World Intellectual Property Organization; the World Meteorological 
Organization; the International Maritime Organization; the International Committee of 
the Red Cross; and the Nonaligned Movement.  
In the mid 1990s the economic situation worsened dramatically.  Following the 
death of DPRK founder Kim Il Sung, the North abandoned some of the more extreme 
manifestations of its self-reliance ideology to accept foreign humanitarian relief and 
create the possibility, as noted above, for foreign investment in the North.  In subsequent 
years, the DPRK has continued to pursue a tightly restricted policy of opening to the 
world in search of economic aid and development assistance.  However, this has been 
matched by an increased determination to counter perceived external or internal threats 
by a self-proclaimed "army first" policy.109 
 
B. NUCLEAR CRISIS AND DEFIANCE OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS 
Many scholars argue that the domestic affairs in the DPRK have left it teetering 
on the brink of collapse, yet its current negotiation strategy and insistent efforts on 
pursuing unilateralism continue to push it further out of the mainstream of the 
international arena.  North Korea rejects international cooperation and international 
intervention as a method of maintaining sovereignty.  This rejection of international order 
and the international community determines North Korea’s role as a “Rogue State.”  In 
spite of the events of the 1990s in which North Korea has made head way in engaging the 
international community, it still attempts to do so on its own terms.  The DPRK has 
shown continued resistance to handling affairs in a multilateral fashion and insist on 
handling security concerns from a realist or zero-sum perspective.  The DPRK refuses to 
acknowledge the idea that its rogue status and quest for proliferation is more than a 
conflict with the United States.  Accordingly, this country also believes issues of tension 
with the ROK are an internal matter that only concerns the two states on the Korean 
Peninsula.  The rest of the world, and more importantly, the major powers disagree.  
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C. MORE THAN JUST A NUCLEAR ISSUE 
In 2002, North Korea implemented changes in its economic policies, including 
sharp increases in prices and wages, relaxations in foreign investment laws, a steep 
currency devaluation, and limited increases in flexibility and responsibility for economic 
enterprises.  The reforms have failed to stimulate recovery of the industrial sector, though 
there are reports of changed economic behavior at the enterprise and individual level.  
One unintended consequence of the 2002 changes has been severe inflation.  North 
Korea's faltering economy and the breakdown of trade relations with the countries of the 
former socialist bloc, especially following the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union, have confronted Pyongyang with difficult policy 
choices.   
North Korea suffers from chronic food shortages, which were exacerbated by 
record floods in the summer of 1995 and continued shortages of fertilizer and parts. 
China and South Korea have responded by making long-term loans on concessional terms 
to pay for food imports and by direct bilateral food, fertilizer, and energy grants and loans 
in-kind.  International organizations and non-governmental organizations are also 
providing significant amounts of food.  In response to international appeals, the United 
States provided nearly two million tons of humanitarian food aid between 1996 and 2003 
through the UN World Food Program and through U.S. private voluntary 
organizations.110 
  In 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and termination of subsidized 
trade arrangements with Russia, other former Communist states, and China, the DPRK 
announced the creation of a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the northeast regions of 
Najin, Chongjin, and Sonbong.  Investment in this SEZ has been slow.  Problems with 
infrastructure, bureaucracy, and uncertainties about investment security and viability 
have hindered growth and development.  The government announced in 2002 plans to 
establish a Special Administrative Region (SAR) in Sinuiju, at the western end of the 
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DPRK-China border.  However, the government has taken few concrete steps to establish 
the Sinuiju SAR, and its future is uncertain.111  
 During this period of limited, extremely cautious opening, North Korea has 
sought to broaden its formal diplomatic relationships as well.  In July 2000, North Korea 
began participating in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), as Foreign Minister Paek 
Nam Sun attended the ARF ministerial meeting in Bangkok July 26-27.  The DPRK also 
expanded its bilateral diplomatic ties in that year, establishing diplomatic relations with 
Italy, Australia, and the Philippines.  The UK, Germany, and many other European 
countries have established diplomatic relations with the North as have Australia and 
Canada.112  
1. North-South Economic Ties: Inter-Korean Relations113   
Two-way trade between North and South Korea, legalized in 1988, had risen to 
$642 million by 2002, much of it processing or assembly work undertaken in the North. 
This is an increase of 59.3% over 2001 but the total includes a substantial quantity of 
non-trade goods provided to the North as humanitarian assistance or as part of inter-
Korean cooperative projects.  An estimated 50.1% of the total trade ($343 million) was 
commercial transactions and trade based on processing-on-commission arrangements. 
Since the June 2000 North-South summit, North and South Korea have reached 
agreement to reconnect east and west coast railroads where they cross the DMZ.  In 
addition, the two governments plan to build highways near both railroad lines.  Much of 
the work on the northern side has been funded by the ROK.  Groundbreaking on the 
Kaesong Industrial Complex, located just north of the DMZ near the western railroad 
line, took place in June 2003.  In an effort to reassure potential ROK investors in August 
2003, North and South Korea ratified four agreements first signed in 2002: an investment 
guarantee agreement; an agreement to avoid double taxation; a dispute settlement 
agreement; and an agreement on clearance of accounting transactions.  It remains to be 
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seen how quickly construction of the Kaesong Industrial Complex will move forward and 
how many South Korean companies will decide to locate operations there.  
2. Trade with the U.S.114  
The United States imposed a total embargo on trade with North Korea in June 
1950 when North Korea attacked the South.  U.S. law also prohibited financial 
transactions between the two countries.  Since 1989 and most notably in June 2000, the 
United States eased sanctions against North Korea to allow a wide range of exports and 
imports of U.S. and DPRK commercial and consumer goods.  Imports from North Korea 
are permitted, subject to an approval process.  Direct personal and commercial financial 
transactions are allowed between U.S. and DPRK persons.  Restrictions on investment 
also have been eased.  Commercial U.S. ships and aircraft carrying U.S. goods are now, 
also allowed to call at DPRK ports.   
The Departments of Treasury, Commerce, and Transportation have issued 
regulations, published in the June 19, 2000, Federal Register, addressing trade and 
financial transactions with North Korea.  This easing of sanctions does not affect U.S. 
counterterrorism or non-proliferation controls on North Korea, which prohibit exports of 
military and sensitive dual-use items and most types of U.S. assistance.  Statutory 
restrictions, such as U.S. missile sanctions, remain in place.  Restrictions on North Korea 
based on multilateral arrangements also remain in place.  Finally, North Korea does not 
enjoy "Normal Trade Relations" with the United States so its goods are subject to a 
higher tariff upon entry to the United States.115 
 
D. DEFENSE AND MILITARY ISSUES116  
North Korea now has the fourth-largest army in the world.  It has an estimated 1.2 
million armed personnel, compared to about 650,000 in the South.  Military spending 
equals 20%-25% of GNP, with about 20% of men ages 17-54 in the regular armed forces.  
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North Korean forces have a substantial numerical advantage over the South 
(approximately 2 or 3 to 1) in several key categories of offensive weapons--tanks, long-
range artillery, and armored personnel carriers.  
The North has perhaps the world's second-largest special operations force, 
designed for insertion behind the lines in wartime.  While the North has a relatively 
impressive fleet of submarines, its surface fleet has a very limited capability.  Its air force 
has twice the number of aircraft as the South, but, except for a few advanced fighters, the 
North's air force is obsolete.  The North deploys the bulk of its forces well forward, along 
the DMZ. Several North Korean military tunnels under the DMZ were discovered in the 
1970s.  
In 1953, the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) was created to oversee and 
enforce the terms of the armistice.  Over the past decade, North Korea has sought to 
dismantle the MAC in a push for a new "peace mechanism" on the peninsula.  In April 
1994, it declared the MAC void and withdrew its representatives.  Over the last several 
years, North Korea has moved more of its rear-echelon troops to hardened bunkers closer 
to the DMZ. Given the proximity of Seoul to the DMZ (some 25 miles), South Korean 
and U.S. forces are likely to have little warning of any attack.  The United States and 
South Korea continue to believe that the U.S. troop presence in South Korea remains an 
effective deterrent.  
 
E. CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS: RENEWED NUCLEAR CRISIS 
In late 2002 and early 2003, North Korea terminated the freeze on its existing 
plutonium-based nuclear facilities, expelled IAEA inspectors and removed seals and 
monitoring equipment, quit the NPT, and resumed reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel to 
extract plutonium for weapons purposes.  North Korea subsequently announced that it 
was taking these steps to provide itself with a deterrent force in the face of U.S. threats 
and the United States' "hostile policy."117  Beginning in mid 2003, the North repeatedly 
claimed to have completed reprocessing of the spent fuel rods previously frozen at  
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Yongbyon and later publicly said that the resulting fissile material would be used to 
bolster its "nuclear deterrent force."  However, there is no independent confirmation of 
North Korea's claims.118  
These events came as a backlash to U.S. policy statements.  In March 2001, 
President Bush had scorned the "sunshine," or engagement, policy of South Korea's 
president, Kim Dae Jung, and expressed skepticism about North Korea's supposedly 
peaceful intentions.  These remarks stood in contradiction to another proclamation of 
U.S. policy, this one by Secretary of State Colin Powell, who had announced earlier the 
same month that the Bush administration intended to pick up negotiations with North 
Korea where the Clinton administration had left off.119 
President Bush has stated publicly that the U.S. has no intention of invading 
North Korea, but that of course does not rule out the possibility of coercive diplomacy.120  
The administration has further stressed that it seeks a peaceful end to North Korea's 
nuclear program in cooperation with North Korea's neighbors, who are most concerned 
with the threat to regional stability and security it poses.   
 
F. U.S. POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA  
1. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula  
As the 1990s progressed, concern over the North's nuclear program became a 
major issue in North-South relations and between North Korea and the United States.  
North Korea joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state 
in 1985, and North and South Korean talks begun in 1990 resulted in a 1992 
Denuclearization Statement.  The lack of progress on implementation of the Joint 
Declaration's provision for an inter-Korean nuclear inspection regime led to reinstatement 
of the U.S.-South Korea Team Spirit military exercise for 1993.  The situation worsened 
rapidly when North Korea, in January 1993, refused IAEA access to two suspected 
nuclear waste sites and then announced in March 1993 its intent to withdraw from the 
NPT.  During the next two years, the U.S. held direct talks with the DPRK that resulted 
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in a series of agreements on nuclear matters.  A UN Security Council Resolution in May 
1993 urged the DPRK to cooperate with the IAEA and to implement the 1992 North-
South Denuclearization Statement.  It also urged all member states to encourage the 
DPRK to respond positively to this resolution and to facilitate a solution of the nuclear 
issue.  U.S.-DPRK talks beginning in June 1993 led in October 1994 to the conclusion of 
the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework.  The Agreed Framework called for the following 
steps:  
• North Korea agreed to freeze its existing nuclear program to be monitored 
by the IAEA.  
• Both sides agreed to cooperate to replace the DPRK’s graphite-moderated 
reactors with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants, to be financed and 
supplied by an international consortium (later identified as the Korean 
Peninsula Energy Development Organization or KEDO).  
• The U.S. and DPRK agreed to work together to store safely the spent fuel 
from the five-megawatt reactor and dispose of it in a safe manner that does 
not involve reprocessing in the DPRK.  
• The two sides agreed to move toward full normalization of political and 
economic relations.  
• Both sides agreed to work together for peace and security on a nuclear-
free Korean Peninsula.  
• Both sides agreed to work together to strengthen the international nuclear 
non-proliferation regime.121 
 
In accordance with the terms of the Agreed Framework, in January 1995 the U.S. 
Government eased economic sanctions against North Korea in response to North Korea's 
decision to freeze its nuclear program and cooperate with U.S. and IAEA verification 
efforts.  North Korea agreed to accept the decisions of KEDO, the financier and supplier 
of the LWRs, with respect to provision of the reactors.  KEDO subsequently identified 
Sinpo as the LWR project site and held a groundbreaking ceremony in August 1997.  In 
December 1999, KEDO and the (South) Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) 
signed the Turnkey Contract (TKC) permitting full-scale construction of the LWRs.  
 In January 1995, as called for in the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework, the U.S. 
and DPRK negotiated a method to store safely the spent fuel from the five-megawatt 
reactor.  According to this method, U.S. and DPRK operators would work together to can 
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the spent fuel and store the canisters in the spent fuel pond.  Actual canning began in 
1995.122  In April 2000, canning of all accessible spent fuel rods and rod fragments was 
declared complete.123  
In 1998, the U.S. identified an underground site in Kumchang-ni, DPRK, which it 
suspected of being nuclear-related.  In March 1999, after several rounds of negotiations, 
the U.S. and DPRK agreed that the U.S. would be granted "satisfactory access" to the 
underground site at Kumchang-ni.  In October 2000, during Special Envoy Jo Myong 
Rok's visit to Washington, and after two visits to the site by teams of U.S. experts, the 
U.S. announced in a Joint Communiqué with the DPRK that U.S. concerns about the site 
had been resolved.124  
As called for in Dr. William Perry's official review of U.S. policy toward North 
Korea, the U.S. and DPRK launched new negotiations in May 2000 called the Agreed 
Framework Implementation Talks.125  Following the inauguration of President George W. 
Bush in January 2001, the new administration began a review of U.S. Policy toward 
North Korea.  The Bush administration and the Republican Party had always been critical 
of the Clinton administration’s dealings with the DPRK.  With the change in 
administrations, U.S. policymakers were encouraged to explore new policy options.126  
At the conclusion of that review, the administration announced on June 6, 2001, that it 
had decided to pursue continued dialogue with North Korea on the full range of issues of 
concern to the administration, including North Korea's conventional force posture, 
missile development and export programs, human rights practices, and humanitarian 
issues.127  In 2002, the administration also became aware that North Korea was 
developing a uranium enrichment program for nuclear weapons purposes.128  
 When U.S.-DPRK direct dialogue resumed in October 2002, this uranium 
enrichment program was high on the U.S. agenda.  North Korean officials acknowledged 
the existence of the uranium enrichment program to a U.S. delegation headed by 
                                                 
122 Reese. pp. 47-58. 
123 Ibid. 
124 U.S. State Department Country Profile. (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm) 
125 Ibid. 
126 Harrison. 
127 Akaha, Tsuneo. The Future of North Korea. NY: Routledge, 2002. p. 83. 
128 Reese. p. 59-68. 
 43
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly.  Such a 
program violated North Korea's obligations under the NPT and its commitments in the 
1992 North-South Denuclearization Declaration and the 1994 Agreed Framework.129  
The United States stated that North Korea would have to terminate the program before 
any further progress could be made in U.S.-DPRK relations.  The U.S. side also made 
clear that if this program were verifiably eliminated, the U.S. would be prepared to work 
with North Korea on the development of a fundamentally new relationship.  In November 
2002, the member countries of KEDO’s Executive Board agreed to suspend heavy fuel 
oil shipments to North Korea pending a resolution of the nuclear dispute.130 
2. U.S. Support for North-South Dialogue and Reunification  
As a stated and long-standing policy of the U.S. State Department, the United 
States supports the peaceful reunification of Korea on terms acceptable to the Korean 
people and recognizes that the future of the Korean Peninsula is primarily a matter for 
them to decide.  The U.S. believes that a constructive and serious dialogue between the 
authorities of North and South Korea is necessary to resolve the issues on the peninsula.  
On his inauguration in February 1998, ROK President Kim Dae-jung enunciated a new 
policy of engagement with North Korea dubbed "the Sunshine Policy."  The policy had 
three fundamental principles: no tolerance of provocations from the North, no intention to 
absorb the North, and the separation of political cooperation from economic cooperation.  
Private sector overtures would be based on commercial and humanitarian considerations.  
The use of government resources would entail reciprocity.  This policy eventually set the 
stage for the first and only inter-Korean summit, held in Pyongyang June 13-15, 2000.  
The summit produced a Joint Declaration noting that the two governments "have agreed 
to resolve the question of reunification independently and through the joint efforts of the 
Korean people. . . ."131  
Following his election and inauguration in February 2003, ROK President Roh 
Moo-hyun promised to continue his predecessor's policy of engagement with the North, 
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though he abandoned the name "Sunshine Policy."  The United States supported 
President Roh's engagement policy and ongoing North-South dialogue.  Since the June 
2000 summit, the two Koreas have held regular ministerial-level meetings to discuss 
North-South political and economic relations.  One meeting of defense ministers was 
held on Cheju Island (South Korea) in 2000.  While North Korea agreed in 2000 that 
North Korean National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong Il would visit South 
Korea in the near future, that visit has yet to take place.  North-South reconciliation has 
also involved a series of reunion meetings between members of families divided during 
the Korean War.  Major economic reunification projects have included the re-
establishment of road and rail links across the DMZ and agreement to set up a joint 
North-South industrial park near the North Korean city of Kaesong.132  
 The United States and the two Korean states are not the only actors that are 
affected by North Korean behavior.133  The current crisis will not be resolved without the 
input of the other major players in international politics.  In order for this issue to be 
resolved in a manner that will be successful and agreeable to all involved, North Korea's 
neighbors have joined the United States in supporting a nuclear weapons-free Korean 
Peninsula.  
 
F. MAJOR POWER INTERESTS IN NORTH KOREA  
1. Russian Perspective 
Historically, Russia has had notable interests in the Korean peninsula.  Over the 
past century, Russia fought two limited wars against maritime powers on the Korean 
peninsula: the first against Japan in 1904–1905 and the second, albeit by proxy, was 
against the United States and its allies from 1950 to 1953.134  Since that time Russia, has 
viewed Korea as a “buffer zone” on its eastern border from the aggressions of the other 
great powers in the Pacific.  Russian interests in the state of affairs on the peninsula are 
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less prominent than the U.S. or China; however, the issue of North Korea’s rogue 
behavior cannot be ignored completely.  Russia is certainly not in favor of an unchecked 
nuclear power next to its only warm water port.  While Russia is predominantly 
concerned with domestic troubles in their changing political and socioeconomic structure, 
it cannot overlook any change on the Korean peninsula that would further complicate the 
existing situation.135  Above all else, Russia’s main priority is to create a situation of 
peace and stability on the peninsula in order to successfully complete its own economic 
and democratic transition.136   
Moscow does not share the United States’ concerns over the current North Korean 
missile programs.  The Russian government attaches great importance to the DPRK 
government’s statement that the North Korean missile program is of peaceful character 
and is not designed to pose a military threat to any country.  However, the Russian 
attitude toward North Korean nuclear development has not been so cavalier.  The USSR 
aided in the development of North Korean nuclear energy capabilities in the 1960s and 
1970s and encouraged the induction of North Korea to the NPT in 1985.  However, the 
USSR does not take responsibility for the North Korean development of a nuclear 
weapons program in the 1980s.137   
In the early 1990s Russia's domestic preoccupations prevented it from aiding in 
resolving the first nuclear crisis.  While Moscow did not agree with all the terms of the 
Agreed Framework it agreed something needed to be done.  Due to preoccupation with 
domestic affairs, it has allowed the United States to take the lead in resolving the crisis.  
At the time, one of Russia’s leading experts admitted, “There is no price that would not 
be worth paying for refusal of any rogue state to acquire nuclear capabilities.” 138 
Regarding the current crisis involving weapons of mass destruction, the Russian 
government has expressed consistent opposition to the presence of any kind of WMDs in 
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Korea and supported transforming the entire Korean peninsula into a Nuclear Weapons 
Free Zone backed by international guarantees of the concerned nuclear powers.139   
2. Chinese Perspective 
A constant theme in Beijing’s foreign and security policy during and after the 
Cold War is opposition to “hegemony and power politics”, a euphemism, initially used 
for the Soviet Union, and more recently, for the United States, and support for 
“multipolarity.”140  This approach in the post-Cold War era has sought to increase 
Chinese influence in regional and international politics by attempting to foster more 
balance, if not opposition to U.S. predominance and freedom of action internationally.  In 
an effort to check U.S. hegemony, China has continually opposed the U.S. raising the 
North Korean nuclear crisis in the UN Security Council.141   
As part of its policy of “anti-hegemony” and “multipolarity,” China has also 
consistently opposed the formation of alliances for security reasons since the 1960s.142  
Over the past few years, Beijing updated this outlook into a new strategic concept that 
defines alliances in the post Cold War world as inherently destabilizing.  This view is 
likely to lead Beijing to seek to prevent the continuation of a strong military alliance 
between the United States and a reunified Korea, especially if Beijing suspects that this 
relationship may be directed against China.143  In light of these interests, China is likely 
to seek a reunified Korea that is more independent of the United States, and an ability to 
exert significant influence over political and security developments in the new Korean 
state.144  China may not seek a formal alliance with Korea, but it will certainly prefer that 
a unified Korea lean toward China.  Such a position aims to create an immediate neighbor 
that does not have too close of an alignment with the United States or Japan, two 
potential adversaries.  Beijing also hopes that a newly unified Korea outside the U.S. 
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alliance system will weaken Washington’s overall influence in the Asia-Pacific, constrain 
U.S. freedom of action, and reduce the potential of China's encirclement.  This view is 
due in part to Korea’s unique geographical, cultural, and historical situation.  Korean 
society shares both traditional cultural ties with China and memories of Japanese 
imperialism.145  Korea sits strategically between China and Japan.  These elements make 
a re-unified Korea a useful friend and buffer for China in the event of hostilities with 
Japan or the United States. 
Since the 1980s, another persistent feature of Chinese policy is the maintenance 
of regional peace and stability to provide an environment that is conducive to its 
economic development.146  In the context of a unified Korea, Beijing’s interest lies in 
maintaining social and political stability on the peninsula despite the inevitable difficult 
transition.  A breakdown in social and political order in a reunified Korea may result in 
violence that can spill over into Chinese provinces bordering Korea, especially areas with 
substantial ethnic Korean populations. 
Economic, social, and political unrest in Korea could also cause a massive influx 
of Korean refugees into Northeastern China that may severely strain resources and social 
infrastructure while upsetting the ethnic balance in some regions.  From the Chinese 
perspective, a peaceful and stable unified Korea also means that Korea may be less likely 
to make strong irredentist claims on disputed border territories under Chinese control, 
since a rapidly growing Korean refugee population in disputed areas may fuel Korean 
claims.147  In that case, the status of migrants together with strong Korean nationalism in 
China’s northeast could be a potential source of tension between China and Korea. 
The presence of U.S. troops on the peninsula following re-unification is a primary 
Chinese concern.  Beijing is unlikely to accept a strong, indefinite U.S. military presence 
on the peninsula that could be part of a containment strategy against China. The ideal 
situation would be a drastic reduction of U.S. ground troops leading to an eventual  
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withdrawal.  However Beijing might accept an initial increase of U.S. forces in Korea for 
peacekeeping purposes even above the 38th Parallel, but only if this leads to an eventual 
withdrawal.148 
The primary interest of China’s communist regime is to promote stability and 
economic development within the country to provide the legitimacy necessary to 
maintain its hold on power.  In the past, China has preferred policy initiatives that would 
stabilize and strengthen the Pyonyang regime in an effort to prevent its collapse.  
However, with the recent renewal of the nuclear crisis, Beijing has changed their 
perspective.  China’s leaders and diplomats have expressed a desire for a negotiated 
agreement resulting in a non-nuclear, peaceful, and stable peninsula.149 
China hopes for relatively steady and sustainable economic growth on the 
peninsula to both maintain China-Korea trade, and prevent the influx of economic 
migrants.150  China will support the development of an open, capitalist, market economy 
in the North to facilitate further growth in trade and investment between the two sides.  In 
this way, a reunified Korea could even become a large market for Chinese products.  
Conversely, a situation where the costs of reunification cause an economic collapse that 
leads to social instability would be economically damaging for China.  Given that South 
Korea is currently a large investor in China, the Chinese economy would also suffer in 
the event of a drastic redirection of South Korean investment away from China and 
toward North Korea.151 
Ideally, the international community will provide enough aid for the rebuilding of 
North Korea to avert an economic collapse.  At the very least, Beijing may be willing to 
provide enough aid to maintain stability and to gain a degree of political influence and 
good will within Korean society.  Beijing expects to divide a significant proportion of the 
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3. Japanese Perspective 
Ultimately, Tokyo wants to make sure that no hostile power can use Korea against 
Japan.  Japan wishes to avoid any Korea that is a nuclear state and that attempts to 
constrain or undermine Japan’s role in regional diplomacy and security.  However, the 
existence of North Korea is not a pressing issue.  The status quo that emerged after the 
1953 armistice on the peninsula has been satisfactory from Japan’s point of view.  It has 
ensured that both Koreas devote most of their martial energies against one other rather 
than against Japan.152  American forces in the ROK further guarantee that South Korea 
will not engage in hostilities against Japan, and protect the South not only from the 
DPRK but also against possible encroachments by China or Russia that would be 
detrimental to Japanese interests.153 
Many Japanese policy experts today recognize that Korea will play a key role in 
Japanese security, and that, regardless of ethical aspects, it is in Japan’s interest to make 
amends for its actions during its colonial era.154  However many Japanese, including 
numerous leading politicians and organizations, especially those affiliated with World 
War II veterans and their families, take the view either that Japan has already apologized 
enough.  The Japanese also believe that Koreans and Chinese exaggerate reports of 
Japanese atrocities during the war.155  Although it is difficult to predict how significant 
the question of occupation guilt and other disputes might become in the future, hostility 
within Korean society toward Japan is deep-seated and can potentially determine its 
relations between the two powers once the common DPRK threat dissolves.156 
Lastly, while Japan will have limited ability to affect the structure of a reunified 
Korean government, it is nonetheless in its interests to limit the influence of former 
DPRK officials in the formation of policy.  Japan will strongly support  
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institutionalization of liberal democracy on the peninsula, but will be wary about 
involving itself directly in the development of a unified Korean government or political 
society, given its colonial legacy.157  
Unless Japan’s security strategy changes drastically, Japan will favor a continued 
U.S. military presence on the peninsula following reunification.  As suggested above, the 
U.S. forces in Korea serve Japan’s interest in guaranteeing that Korea will be neither 
hostile nor in alignment with unfriendly countries.158  It is also in Japan’s national interest 
that a U.S. military presence in the region maintain the regional balance of power, and in 
turn allow Japan to focus on economic rather than military competition.  If the U.S. 
forces were withdrawn entirely from the peninsula, Japan would be the only remaining 
East Asian nation hosting American forces, placing Japan under intense domestic 
political pressure concerning this uneven burden and threatening the entire U.S. regional 
military presence.  Maintaining a strong and mobile U.S. presence dedicated to 
promoting regional stability would also serve Japanese security interests and save Japan 
from standing out politically in Asia as the only evident U.S. military ally.159 
Finally, Japan has a concrete interest in ensuring that the DPRK's weapons of 
mass destruction and missile arsenal are decommissioned under international control. 
Unless the DPRK physically destroys its missiles, nuclear facilities, and biochemical 
arsenal, a united Korea will inherit the North’s WMD and delivery systems.160  Japan has 
a profound interest in preventing the emergence of a reunified Korea as a nuclear power 
with missiles capable of striking Japan.   
 Japan has been most supportive of the U.S. hard line position on North Korea, but 
is not unwilling to engage in bilateral communication with Pyongyang.161  One of the 
greatest barriers to normalization of Japanese-North Korean relations has been an 
abduction of five Japanese citizens during the Cold War.  Now that this situation has 
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finally been resolved in good faith, the next step toward normalization of relations is the 
nuclear issue.162 
 
G. THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS 
1. U.S. Engagement Toward the Nuclear Crisis  
Beginning in early 2003, the United States proposed multilateral talks among the 
most concerned parties aimed at reaching a settlement through diplomatic means.  North 
Korea initially opposed such a process, maintaining that the nuclear dispute was purely a 
bilateral matter between the United States and the DPRK.163  This was yet another 
instance in which North Korea has refused to accept the notion of resolving problems in a 
collective fashion.  North Korean policymakers and diplomats have continued to maintain 
a very narrow scope of their world-view.164  However, with pressure from its neighbors 
and active involvement of China, North Korea agreed to three-party talks with China and 
the United States in Beijing in April 2003.  Subsequently, North Korea agreed to six-
party talks with the United States, China, South Korea, Japan and Russia in August 2003, 
also in Beijing.  To date these nations have met in this forum four times.  So far, there has 
been minimal progress toward defining a resolution; however, all parties continue to 
engage in the process and display intent to achieve resolution.165 
2. The Six-Party Talks 
During the first round of talks in August 2003, North Korea agreed to the eventual 
elimination of its nuclear programs if the United States were first willing to sign a 
bilateral non-aggression treaty and meet various other conditions, including the provision 
of substantial amounts of aid and normalization of relations.  The North Korean proposal 
was unacceptable to the United States.  The United States insisted on a multilateral 
resolution to the issue, and refused to provide benefits or incentives for North Korea to 
abide by its previous international obligations.  The current administration is hesitant to 
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engage North Korea bilaterally.  Many in the Bush administration have denounced the 
Agreed Framework of 1994 and view the Clinton administration’s handling of the issue 
as giving in to blackmail.166  The current U.S. administration believes rewarding bad 
behavior will beget more of the same.167    In October 2003, President Bush said he 
would be willing to consider a multilateral written security guarantee contingent upon 
specific concessions from North Korea, namely complete, verifiable, and irreversible 
dismantlement (CVID) of its nuclear weapons program.168  
China hosted a second round of six-party talks in Beijing in February 2004.  At 
this time, South Korea offered its own proposal in which it stated it was willing to take 
the lead in promoting economic development and provide energy assistance if North 
Korea would freeze the nuclear program.  Both China and Russia were supportive of the 
South Korean plan, but the United States and Japan were against incentive-based 
proposals.169  The United States saw the progress as positive, including the announced 
intention to hold a third round by the end of June, and a willingness of all parties to form 
a working group to keep the process going between plenary sessions.  China, Japan, 
Russia and the ROK have all accepted the United States' position that the central 
objective of the process was CVID of the North’s nuclear programs.170    
 As stated in the previous chapter, China appears intent on resolving the current 
crisis in a peaceful manner.  Accordingly, it has acted as an “honest broker” between the 
United States and the DPRK as well as served as a host for the negotiation process.171  
China differs from the U.S. in that it is willing to offer incentives to Pyongyang in return 
for dismantlement of its nuclear programs.  Also, China does not support the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI), which is a U.S. engineered effort to interdict weapons shipments 
to and from terrorists and countries of proliferation concern.172  A further complication 
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came in May of 2004, when the IAEA announced that it has strong evidence that North 
Korea supplied Libya with about two tons of uranium.173   
The third round of talks were held in June 2004.  During these negotiations, the 
United States offered North Korea a new proposal for resolution.  The offer stated that 
North Korea would receive the delivery of heavy fuel oil from Russia, China, and South 
Korea and that the United States would draft a provisional multilateral security agreement 
if North Korea agrees to disclose details of its weapons program, allows inspections, and 
begins to dismantle its nuclear program within three months.174  Additionally the United 
States would begin to remove economic sanctions on North Korea.  It was reported to 
Arms Control Today by an administration official, that the U.S. did not expect the DPRK 
to readily accept the terms, but rather it was a test to discover North Korean intentions.175 
North Korea countered the U.S. by submitting its own proposal.  North Korea agreed to 
put a “freeze” on all production, testing and transporting of nuclear weapons, in return for 
energy assistance in the sum of two million kilowatts, which happens to be the amount of 
power that would have been produced by the two reactors that were promised under the 
1994 Agreed Framework.176  The diplomats from Pyongyang expressed a degree of 
conditionality in their proposal, implying the freeze would depend on the receipt of 
energy assistance.  They further stated that the United States was being unrealistic in the 
three-month deadline.  All parties have agreed to sit down for a fourth round of talks 
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IV. THE REALITY OF BEING A ROGUE STATE 
North Korea was created as state in1948.  Throughout the entirety of its existence 
it has been considered a pariah state. The creation of the North Korean state was a result 
of its own rejection of international intervention.  The state declared sovereignty when 
the UN Commission and the trustee parties could not resolve the situation of a divided 
Korea.  The result was the Korean War and what many believe to be the beginning of the 
Cold War in Asia. Throughout the Cold War, this state continued a path of self-reliance 
and limited engagement. 
The fall of the Soviet empire and its satellite states left the Kim regime and the 
hermetic kingdom to turn even further inward.  The eleven-year period that passed from 
the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 to the revival of nuclear crisis in 2002 was a 
remarkable opportunity for North Korea to move from its Cold War mind set to 
becoming a free and open society, or at least more in line with the main stream.177  And 
while it seemed there were many instances of the transition for which the rest of the 
world was hoping, there was no great transformation.  North Korea engaged and then 
withdrew, threatened the world with a nuclear crisis in the early 1990s and then made 
dramatic steps toward the reunification of the peninsula at the end of the decade.  While 
this balance of engagement and isolationism may have helped to ensure a continued 
communist regime and the succession of Kim Jong Il, it may also have been the cause of 
greater confrontation with the rest of the international arena, including the major powers.  
The first evidence of this came just four short years after the fall of Soviet communism 
with the 1994 Nuclear Crisis.   
In 1993, the U.S.-DPRK negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
reached an impasse.  The United States, a dominant world superpower acting in the 
interest of global security, was unable to make North Korea back down.178  The DPRK 
was a weak, isolated state negotiating on the brink and still refused to admit defeat at all 
cost.179  This time North Korea had become the main player at the table and was not 
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merely a pawn of a greater conflict.  While some may argue the issue on size and 
strength, the crisis was a striking flashback to previous negotiations of the Cold War.180  
It almost seemed as though North Korea did not understand the Cold War was over and it 
no longer had the superpower support to back its plays.  Or perhaps North Korea 
understood but did not care.  
At the end of the negotiations, the DPRK did make concessions and it agreed to 
discontinue nuclear advancement.  After these negotiations, North Korea began to openly 
communicate with South Korea and pursue what had become called inter-Korean 
relations.181  North Korea also began to turn some of its economic sensors on to the rest 
of the world.  Just ten years later, it looks as though that door is shutting again.     
Recently, North Korea has announced it has reinstated nuclear weaponization.   Once 
again, North Korea continually backs away from the bargaining table and refuses to 
admit defeat when faced head on with the world’s major powers.  The ongoing “six 
party” talks are more off than they are on.   These struggles and difficulties dealing with 
the North Korean state result from an evolving pattern of this unique brand of 
communism.  The juche ideology and the Kim regime have driven the North Korean state 
so far into an isolationist hole that this brinkmanship style of diplomacy may be all that 
remains.182  Korean Communism has outlasted almost all the communist regimes.  The 
spread of the Cold War to Asia first occurred on Korean soil and North Korea continues 
to fight that war. 
When North Korea acknowledged the existence of its clandestine nuclear program 
in October of 2002, diplomatic progress ended instantly.  Once the news broke, 
Pyongyang quickly offered to halt the nuclear program in exchange for a non-aggression 
pact with the United States.  But Washington, unwilling to reward bad behavior, initially 
refused to open a dialogue unless the North first abandoned its nuclear efforts.  In 
November, the United States went a step further: saying that Pyongyang had violated the 
1994 Agreed Framework and several other nuclear nonproliferation pacts, Washington 
engineered the suspension of deliveries of the 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil sent to the 
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North each year under the 1994 accord.  In the weeks following the suspension of fuel 
shipments, the United States hardened its stance against dialogue with North Korea, 
despite the fact that most U.S. allies were encouraging a diplomatic solution to the 
situation.  North Korea responded by announcing plans to reopen its Yongbyon nuclear 
facilities.  It immediately removed the seals and monitoring cameras from its frozen 
nuclear labs and reactors and, a few days later, began to move its dangerous spent fuel 
rods out of storage.  On December 31 2002, it expelled the inspectors of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  And on January 9 2003, it announced its withdrawal 
from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.183  Pyongyang subsequently announced its 
intention to reopen the critical reprocessing plant in February 2003.   
Until recently, U.S. relations with North Korea were guided by the 1994 Agreed 
Framework, in which Washington offered heavy fuel oil and help building nuclear energy 
plants in exchange for Pyongyang's promise to shut down its nuclear weapons program.  
This agreement has reached its critical implementation stage, testing the intentions of 
both countries and sparking debates within the United States over whether it should 
revise or abandon the accord.184  
     
A. NORTH KOREAN PERSPECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
The United States and the major powers in the international order have declared 
North Korea to be a “rogue state.”  They claim North Korea is an irrational actor who 
threatens the security of the “peace loving” majority.  Human rights issues and the 
nuclear crisis are not the only characteristics that pigeonhole North Korea as a rogue.  As 
previously mentioned, continued isolationism is yet another factor keeping this state from 
being fully engaged in the world system.  The rest of the world is moving toward 
increased globalization.  Globalization should not be thought of in just economic terms.  
Nor should these networks of interdependence be thought of as a new convention. Global 
economic interdependence has spread and tied people together, but environmental, 
military, social, and political interdependence have also increased.  Although a 
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hierarchical world government does not exist, nor is it likely desirable, many forms of 
global governance and methods of managing common affairs already exist.  Hundreds of 
non-governmental organizations now regulate the global dimensions of trade, 
telecommunications, civil aviation, health, the environment, meteorology, and many 
other issues.185  North Korean apathy regarding this trend critically limits its ability to 
grow and prosper in the future.   
The United States has labeled North Korea a rogue state and a threat to U.S. 
security and the world has echoed that sentiment.  Some argue the major powers are the 
ones that have forced the DPRK to take on the rogue persona.186  The major powers, 
namely the U.S., China, Japan, Russia, and the European Union, are traditionally the 
nations making the rules.  They dominate the United Nations, and most of them hold the 
key seats on the UN Security Council.  Their statesmen and diplomats have agreed on the 
precepts of international law, and what characteristics a state must be willing to 
accommodate if they want to be considered part of the international community.  All of 
this, of course, implies the acceptance of an international order, which hinges on some 
sort of structure or which validates that idea of complex interdependence. 
Therefore, the rogue is the state that refuses to accept this international order, 
refuses to conform and refuses to give up its claims to unfettered sovereignty.  More 
often than not, the rogue state is likely to be a weak state which must either conform and 
bandwagon with the superpowers or somehow even the playing field.187   In North 
Korea’s case it is its pursuit of a nuclear arsenal and brinkmanship style of diplomacy 
that gives it a voice.  In fact, it is this tactic that has kept North Korea afloat for all these 
years.  When faced with the threat of economic sanctions, the DPRK effectively uses 
threats to counter other nations.188  According to the realist view, the fundamental player 
in international relations is the state.  In his 1992 Agenda for Peace Report to the General 
Assembly, then UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, stated that  
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this wider mission of making the United Nations stronger and more 
efficient… will demand the concerted attention and effort of the individual 
States, or regional and non-governmental organizations and of all of the 
United Nations system… but the foundation stone of this work is and must 
remain the State.  Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are 
crucial to any common international progress.189   
This view of the state as the primary international actor is not new.  More than a 
generation ago, some of the most prominent international scholars described the 
continuing dominance of the state as the central feature of the international system.  
Columbia University Professor Wolfgang Friedmann acknowledged this primacy because 
it 
is by virtue of their law-making power and monopoly that the states enter 
into bilateral and multilateral compacts, that wars can be started or 
terminated, that individuals can be punished or extradited…and the very 
notion of State would be eventually superseded only if national entities 
absorbed into a world state…190 
 
 If the state is the principle actor in international relations, why is there even a 
question of North Korea’s actions?  As a sovereign state concerned with survival, it is 
completely justified in working toward possessing nuclear capabilities.  And furthermore, 
the North Koreans are perfectly justified in running their country, economy and providing 
for their people as the government sees fit.  Or are they? 
In 1948 the vast majority of states signed the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, thereby committing themselves to respect over thirty separate rights for 
individuals.  As it was not a legally binding declaration and contained no enforcement 
provisions, the declaration left states’ sovereignty intact, but it was a first step towards 
creating international, universal obligations regarding states’ internal affairs.   
However, declarations such as these only work if one accepts the concept of 
international law and norms.  In the absence of an international law enforcement 
mechanism, the only thing that binds a particular nation to international law is a 
willingness to conform to “international norms.”  Furthermore, the nation in question has 
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to accept a system which presumes that international norms exist.  According to 
Hobbesian theory, laws are only valid when an individual, in this case the nation-state, is 
willing to give up some freedoms in order to enter the ‘social contract.’  In the case of 
nations, the principle freedom that must be sacrificed is sovereignty.  Despite the UN’s 
case that sovereignty is the first standard of the organization, one can argue that there is a 
degree of conformity that nations are subject to.  They consequently lose the ability to act 
contrarily without being sanctioned.  Additionally, in the interdependent society of 
nations there are a number of transnational organizations, such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which expect nations 
to adhere to a prescribed set of rules.  These rules or norms inherently require a nation to 
give up some degree of sovereignty.        
 As discussed in Chapter I, these norms are set by the majority of nations that 
make up what some refer to as the international community.  However, there are many 
who question whether or not an international community is a natural step in the evolution 
of the international order, or if it is a construct of the major powers, created in order to 
keep weaker nations in line.191  If the major powers foster and encourage a complex 
interdependent world system then weaker nations have no choice but to fall in line.  
Smaller nations are inclined to join the international community in the interest of 
security, economic prosperity, and success for the future.    
 Some have argued that the current world system has been uni-polar since the end 
of the Cold War.  The United States is the world’s only remaining superpower and there 
are several other great powers such as China and the EU that compete for power and 
attempt to balance against the hegemonic status of the United States.192  In recent months, 
the United States has also been referred to as a rogue state.193  With the unilateral efforts 
in Iraq, many scholars and policymakers have stated that the United States is dangerously 
drifting into rogue status and departing from the international norms.  If this the case, 
what are the consequences and what are the ramifications? Some would argue that this 
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shows evidence of the previous point that great powers can act in a hegemonic fashion 
and act independent of the international community.  While the EU and China are gaining 
steam, there is currently no nation that can put its thumb down on the United States and 
regulate its activities, through economic sanctions or the threat of military force.  There is 
no nation powerful enough, and the likelihood of a coalition of this magnitude is highly 
unlikely as well.  The United States created the United Nations, the Nonproliferation 
Treaty, as well as the Land Mine Treaty, yet refuses to acquiesce to the same standards 
and norms to which it has had other nations agree.   
 However, the United States has behaved in this fashion for generations and only 
recently have other states begun to consider it as a possible rogue.  This could be a sign 
of the evolution of the international order.  Now, for the first time the rest of the 
legitimate powers in the system are unified by the same principles that an international 
community still maintains shape even when the hegemon pulls away from the rest of the 
group.  Or could it be that the whole idea of a rogue nation is a misguided supposition?  
The Clinton administration switched the name to “state of concern” because it was more 
politically palatable to other nations.  It seems more appropriate as well.  A state such as 
North Korea is only a rogue from the perspective of those nations that view the system as 
an international community that is built on a system of complex interdependence.  But if 
Keohane and Nye are right, the reality of the world situation falls somewhere in the 
middle of the spectrum between anarchy and complex interdependence.  Maybe it is a 
sliding scale in which depending on the time and place in history, the reality shift along 
that spectrum.  Very likely, it seems that that reality depends on the way an individual 
state perceives the world order.  States are sovereign actors that can form alliances and 
agreements to balance power, preserve security, ensure peace, or foster economic 
prosperity.  States are also inclined to act independently when it serves their own best 
self-interests.   
 The problem arises when two or more countries are forced to come together to 
resolve problems and they are approaching the situation from the opposite sides of the 
international spectrum.  The major powers including the United States have been inclined 
to view the North Korean security threat as an international or multilateral problem.  
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North Korea, on the other hand is a late comer to the international order.  A borderline 
failing state, North Korea was opposed to western norms and ideologies throughout the 
Cold War.  After the fall of the Soviet Union and the market democratization that has 
occurred in China.  North Korea has stood alone in its rejection of a cooperative 
international community.  It turned from communism to a cult-like ideology and pursued 
primarily isolationist policies in order to survive.  The major powers in the system have 
worked together to bring the DPRK to the negotiating table to attempt to resolve the 
current crisis, yet North Korea still engages in negotiation on its own terms.  Rather than 
being an irrational actor, North Korea is very logical in its approach.  The problem 
remains that it uses an approach for a very different kind of international system than the 
one in which the rest of the players are operating.  
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